The Threat of Nuclear Attacks: Theory and Practice
by Brian Harring
Although there are many problems inherent in a political nuclear attack on a U.S. target; nevertheless, such an attack is entirely possible given all of the factors involved. An attack with a nuclear weapon, including the detonation of a so-called “dirty bomb” [emphasis mine - emdrone] would have a devastating impact both in property damage, massive loss of life and major economic disruption. It can be stated with confidence that any anti-American group, domestic or foreign in composition has the possibility of creating, delivering and exploding some kind of a nuclear weapon against any specific target.
It is estimated that the detonation of a ten to twenty kiloton weapon in the middle of any large city such as New York, Los Angeles, Paris, Berlin, Tokyo or Moscow would kill upwards of a half a million people immediately with an equal number dying later of radiation effects. Injuries would range in the hundreds of thousands and there would be an enormous property loss. Such an attack would have a catastrophic effect on the morale of the country in which it occurred and the damage to the target country’s economy would be devastating in both the short and long ranges. Political damage would be corresponding as the terrified citizenry would demand relief and assurances that there would be no more attacks and that the attackers would be immediately identified and destroyed, ending the perils of any pending and undefendable attacks.
Any such study should consider the means by which atomic weaponry could be obtained or created and the means by which such a weapon, or weapons, could be delivered to their target. In this study, we will use the United States as an example although the basic factors would be equally applicable in other countries.
Types of Atomic Weapons: An Overview
There are two basic types of nuclear weapons which could be utilized by terrorist organizations as opposed to a number of other conventional weapons which could be utilized by conventional military opponents.
The first type is called in the trade, a “gun type” which consists of a specific mass of highly enriched uranium (isotope 234- Highly Enriched Uranium or hereinafter HEU) which is propelled down a tube or barrel into another HEU mass. This causes critical mass and results in a nuclear explosion.
This was the original atomic bomb used in 1945.
The second most feasible atomic weapon is called an implosion device which uses Weapons Grade Plutonium, hereinafter WGPU. This is typically constructed of isotope 239, an outer shell of which is encircled with explosives that are times to produce an implosion wave that compresses the plutonium sufficiently to produce critical mass
This was the second atomic bomb used in 1945.
Although this device is more complex in theory, it is entirely possible for such a weapon to be manufactured without a massive support system.
Acquisition of atomic weapons
As opposed to terrorists constructing atomic devices, it is more likely that these could be obtained, ready-made from several existing sources, primarily from stocks now located in the former Soviet Union
In the 1960s, the Soviet Union launched R&D to miniaturize and improve reliability of nuclear weapons. Development activities included strategic systems for the Navy; cruise missiles, aviation bombs and artillery projectiles [the smallest nuclear charge was developed for a 152mm artillery projectile].The model is based on unclassified data on the components in an atomic artillery shell, to see if such a system could be reassembled in a suitcase. Indeed, as it turns out, the physics package, neutron generators, batteries, arming mechanism and other essentials of a small atomic weapon can fit, just barely, in an attaché case. The result is a plutonium-fueled gun-type atomic weapon having a yield of one-to-ten kilotons, the same yield range attributed by Russian General Lebed to the Russian "nuclear suitcase" weapon."
In 1991 the US unilaterally withdrew its nuclear artillery shells from service, and Russia responded in kind in 1992. The US removed around 1,300 nuclear shells from Europe. The Russian Defense Ministry has stated officially through the offices of Lieutenant General Igor Valynkin, the head of the ministry’s Twelfth Main Directorate, which is responsible for the storage and security of nuclear weapons, attempted to reassure journalists about the safety of the Russian nuclear arsenal that absolutely all nuclear weapons in the Russian armed forces are currently in the custody of his directorate, which ensures their “state acceptance at the factory, storage in arsenals, servicing, and their transport to the troops.” Valynkin said that because of concerns about the “criminal situation” in Russia, at the beginning of the 1990s all Russian tactical nuclear weapons, including nuclear mines and artillery shells, were removed from the arsenals of individual military units and transferred to special storage sites under the control of the Twelfth Directorate. This step was taken in order to prevent terrorists from gaining access to the weapons, as the arsenals at individual units are much less secure than the central storage sites Referring directly to the issue of the “suitcase” bombs, Valynkin admitted that is technically possible to build a small low-yield nuclear warhead..
According to the NRDC Nuclear Weapons Databook, a standard reference work on American nuclear forces published by the Natural Resources Defense Council, the United States did deploy a low-yield Special Atomic Demolition Munition (SADM), based on the W-54 warhead. The SADM could be transported in a shipping case not too much larger than that described by Lebed (89x66x66cm), and is reported to have weighed “less than 163 pounds” (74 kg). In its operational form it may have weighed quite a bit less, and been considerably smaller than the shipping case noted above, since the same warhead was used in the now-retired Davy Crockett system, which used a recoilless rifle to launch a nuclear-armed projectile. A small weapon would probably be a uranium or plutonium implosion device, possibly boosted with tritium to compensate for the reduced amount of conventional explosive used to compress the fissile core in the compact device. Neither the uranium nor plutonium metals used in the fissile core of such a bomb would need frequent maintenance, and even tritium, which has a half-life of 12.3 years, and must be recharged periodically, would not need replenishing so frequently.. Since the United States maintained a stockpile of several hundred such systems for at least twenty years, it seems unlikely that the maintenance cost for such systems is so high as to have been prohibitive for the USSR.
It is known that in the early 1990s, a number of tactical nuclear weapons were obtained from Russian sources and marketed to entities located in Pakistan. (see Report No. 32 under date of August 1, 2004, in re ATWOOD)
The strong possibility of diversion of special nuclear material (SNM, or fissile material) from Russia is most acute because large inventories of SNM are stored at many sites that apparently lack inventory controls, and indigenous threats have increased.
A related concern is that Pakistan might be the source of nuclear weapons or materials for terrorists under several scenarios: (1) Islamists in the armed services might provide such assistance covertly under the current government; (2) if that government were overthrown by fundamentalists, as now appears to be extremely possible, the new government might make weapons available to terrorists; or (3) such weapons might become available if chaos, rather than a government, followed the overthrow.
Other nations are seeking nuclear weapons.
Iran has a program to produce HEU, North Korea has reprocessed WGPU from spent nuclear fuel, and there is little disagreement inside the [U.S.] government over the intelligence indicating North Korea has been secretly building uranium enrichment capability in violation of the 1994 accord. The prospect that some nations might provide such materials to other states or to terrorists is a source of concern in American counter-terrorist agencies. A.Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan’s atomic bomb, ran a covert operation for many years that provided Libya, North Korea, and Iran with equipment for making HEU and plans for making an atomic bomb. Such nations might use these weapons themselves, or leak or sell weapons, material, or expertise to terrorist groups.
Domestic or foreign nuclear research reactors offer still another route to obtaining a weapon. More than 130 research reactors still use HEU as their fuel, in more than 40 countries. Most of these facilities have very modest security — in many cases, with minimal security measures in place.. A more recent Government Accountability Office report stated that as of July 30, 2004, “39 of the 105 research reactors targeted by DOE [for conversion from HEU to low. enriched uranium, or LEU] have converted to LEU fuel.” Six of these reactors are on U.S. university campuses and have minimal security.
A gun-assembly weapon need not be particularly large. The Hiroshima bomb weighed 8,900 pounds and was 10 feet long and 28 inches in diameter. Much of that size and weight, however, was taken up by an armored steel shell and stabilizing fins, as well as by arming, fusing, and firing devices. The gun barrel — the actual nuclear explosive device — measured 6 feet in length by over 6 inches in diameter and weighed about a half-ton. Simple improvements might shrink size and weight. A terrorist-made implosion weapon or a weapon stolen from a nation’s arsenal could be smaller. In short, a weapon could fit in a car, boat, or small airplane, and would occupy a small corner of a shipping container. The smallest possible bomb-like object would be a single critical mass of plutonium (or U-233) at maximum density under normal conditions. An unreflected spherical alpha-phase critical mass of Pu-239 weighs 10.5 kg and is 10.1 cm across.
A single critical mass cannot cause an explosion however since it does not cause fission multiplication, somewhat more than a critical mass is required for that. But it does not take much more than a single critical mass to cause significant explosions. As little as 10% more (1.1 critical masses) can produce explosions of 10-20 tons. This low yield seems trivial compared to weapons with yields in the kilotons or megatons, but it is actually far more dangerous than conventional explosives of equivalent yield due to the intense radiation emitted. A 20 ton fission explosion, for example, produces a very dangerous 500 rem radiation exposure at 400 meters from burst point, and a 100% lethal 1350 rem exposure at 300 meters.
From Construction to Delivery
The United States has many thousands of miles of land and water borders, as well as several hundred sea, land, and air ports of entry — 317 by conservative estimate— giving terrorists many pathways to smuggle a nuclear bomb into this nation. There are many types of borders ranging from open seas (tropical to temperate to Arctic), land and river borders with Mexico and Canada, and the Great Lakes. Each poses its own set of opportunities, and challenges or putative challenges, for terrorists seeking to bring atomic weapons into the continental United States. Length of U.S. Borders in miles: Alaskan coast 6,640; Hawaiian coast, 750; Pacific coast excluding Alaska and Hawaii; 1,293; Border with Mexico,1,933; Gulf of Mexico coast, 1,631; Atlantic coast, 2,069; Great Lakes, 970; Alaskan-Canadian border,1,538; Border with Canada excluding Alaska and Great Lakes 3,017. Total 19,841 miles
Legal, and illegal, land crossings into the United States also present terrorists with different risks and opportunities. Legal crossings are: seaports, airports, and border stations on roads entering the United States. Illegal crossings constitute the thousands of miles of unguarded stretches of coasts and land borders. Note that legal points of entry have an immense volume of traffic, almost all of it legal, and a corresponding concentration of people and resources of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The task of CBP is to find the needle in the haystack while expediting legal traffic. Attempts to smuggle a nuclear weapon through a legal crossing would run the risk that the weapon might be detected by computerized screening of cargo manifests, imaging devices (similar to x-rays), neutron activation devices, or physical inspection, as discussed below. That risk is reduced by the need for CBP agents to process huge numbers of vehicles, vessels, and passengers, leaving little time or attention for those not raising suspicions, and by the low radioactivity of fissile uranium-235 — approximately one hundred-millionth that of radioactive material that might be used in a “dirty bomb.”
CBP resources are spread much more thinly along points of illegal entry such as long, undefended and unmanned borders with Canada and, to a lesser degree, Mexico. An attempt to smuggle a nuclear weapon across an unguarded section of border would avoid the risk that the weapon might be detected, but CBP agents would only need to detect the smugglers, not the weapon: anyone or anything entering the United States across national borders is illegal
On the other hand, risk to smugglers is reduced because CBP faces an immense task in patrolling the vast stretches of borders. In point of fact, it is now completely impossible for CBP to secure the long borders of the United States with any degree of success. The number of agents and surveillance equipment needed would impossible to budget or implement under any circumstances.
Terrorists could certainly avoid the risks attendant in smuggling across both legal and illegal points of entry if they could place a weapon on board an airplane, commercial or private, or vessel bound for the United States and detonate it before it could be inspected, such as in the air above a city or as it entered a seaport.
Scenarios for smuggling a nuclear weapon across unguarded coasts or borders are similar to those for smuggling bales of marijuana, many of which are repeatedly flown in by private aircraft and off-loaded at remote southwestern United States areas or brought by small , common boats such as locally-based fishing or pleasure craft, or carried across land borders; the complete impossibility of patrolling the borders makes such scenarios feasible. A key difference between smuggling marijuana and a nuclear weapon is that in the former case, losses due to interception by CBP are expected and are viewed as a cost of doing business. Terrorists attempting to smuggle a nuclear weapon into the United States, in contrast, would presumably have only one or a few weapons and would have to go to great lengths to succeed. Conversely, because of the great value of a nuclear weapon to terrorists, methods that create a substantial probability of detecting an attempt to smuggle a weapon into the United States might deter such an attempt. This cautionary attitude, however, is offset by the relative ease of entering the United States without detection.
Another entirely valid and very dangerous scenario would be the smuggling of a nuclear weapon in a shipping container. These metal boxes, typically 8 by 8 by 20 feet or 8 by 8 by 40 feet, are used to transport vast quantities of goods ranging from clothes to computers to automobile engines. Some 7 million containers enter the United States by ship each year; container ships may carry several thousand containers. From seaports, they are transported by truck or rail throughout the country. The concern is that if terrorists could place a bomb in a container overseas, they could ship it into the United States and transport it anywhere in the country. Under the Container Security Initiative (CSI), discussed below, CBP agents and their foreign counterparts screen containers being loaded onto container ships at certain foreign ports, and the foreign agents inspect containers that the screening identifies as suspicious, based on ports of call, manifest data, shipping company, etc. Terrorists, however, might try to circumvent CSI by acquiring a trusted shipping company to avoid suspicion, falsifying manifest data, infiltrating CSI ports, shipping from non-CSI ports. A nuclear explosion in a U.S. port from a bomb in a shipping container would have not only direct effects, but could also have far-reaching effects on the world economy because of its dependence on container traffic, an effect magnified by industry’s use of “just-in-time” deliveries.
Simply put, the shipping of sea containers would stop. The American people, for one, would not likely permit one more sea container to enter the United States following a nuclear incident until there was a significantly greater assurance — such as 100% inspections — that no additional terrorist weapons would be smuggled into the country. Governments in other major industrial countries would no doubt adopt a similar policy, thus effectively bringing the global economy to its knees. In point of fact, the study of guerrilla warfare shows that the ends are always superior to the means and even a serious threat to economic stability is far more serious than merely blowing up the port facilities at Long Beach, Houston or Hampton Roads.
Another possible scenario is the use of an oil tanker to transport a nuclear weapon. The Middle East is the dominant source of anti-American terrorism and it should be noted that the United States imports an average of more than 2 million barrels of crude oil a day from Persian Gulf nations, this crude oil is transported by ship, and it would be very difficult to detect a bomb inside a supertanker. Also note that the President of Venezuela, another major source of sea-transported oil, Hugo Chavez is very angry with the United States because of clumsy attempts on the part of the CIA to depose him. Aside from denying Venezuelan oil to the United States, it is entirely likely that Chavez would turn a blind eye to terrorist activities in his country aimed at the United States.
Part of the difficulty of detecting a bomb inside a huge tanker full of crude oil would arise from the sheer size of supertankers, which carry 100,000 deadweight tons or more of crude oil. For example, two supertankers built in 2003 for COSCO (China Ocean Shipping) Group were 330 meters (almost a quarter-mile) long and 60 meters in beam, and had a capacity of about 300,000 deadweight tons. There are even larger tankers that carry 500,000 deadweight tons of crude oil, and have a length of 396 meters and a beam of 71 meters. On land, some detection devices use gamma rays (high-energy x-rays) to peer inside a shipping container and create an x-ray-type image, but the size of a supertanker and the thickness of the steel (especially with the use of double hulls) make this technique unworkable. Another possible means of detecting a nuclear weapon is neutron activation, in which a burst of neutrons is sent into the item to be examined, such as a shipping container; neutrons that strike uranium-235 (or other radioactive material) will cause some atoms to fission, releasing neutrons and gamma rays. Any neutron coming back as a result of neutron bombardment would be suspicious. The gamma rays produced by the disintegration of each isotope have a unique set of energies, creating a “fingerprint” that permits identification of the isotope. However, neutrons sent into the oil and any produced by fissioning of uranium would be absorbed (forming deuterium or tritium) or scattered by the hydrogen atoms in crude oil, and the large volume of oil would attenuate any gamma rays produced, defeating this form of detection. At the same time, designing a means to detonate a bomb inside a tanker could prove a technical challenge for terrorists.
A bomb in a tanker in theory could devastate a oil receiving port facility by the blast and by secondary fires in nearby refineries and oil storage tanks. However, that having been said, oil itself does not explode. It does burn and fires could wreak havoc if a tanker is in the process of unloading or in the vicinity of port facilities. A bomb in a tanker would set the cargo on fire and eventually sink the ship and do damage if the ship is in port but the blast in and of itself would be minimal insofar as adjacent targets are concerned A ship-borne bomb might be used against other maritime targets, such as the Panama Canal, although the size of modern super tankers precludes the passage of many of the larger ones through this trade artery. And if a bomb in a shipping container could lead to the shutdown of container traffic, seriously damaging the world economy, a tanker bomb might by the same token lead to the suspension of crude oil shipments, with similar results.
Responses Currently Available to US Security Agencies: Theory vs Practice
At this point, three years after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the components of the U.S. and global response have become clearer. The response is often termed “layered defense,” reflecting the idea that in hopeful theory, terrorists would have to proceed through many steps to acquire a nuclear weapon and smuggle it into the United States, and that attempting to thwart them at each step has a higher likelihood of success than trying to block one step only.
The concept of “layered defense” is just that; a theory which, considering the enormous logistical problems involved, is not viable and is designed solely to ease public fears.. In any event, many programs have been established to deal with nuclear terrorism since 9/11, with others created well before that landmark date but it is simply a matter of logistics as to their potential ability to prevent a terrorist attack.
I. Threat Reduction Programs in the Former Soviet Union. The Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 also known as the Nunn-Lugar Amendment, authorized a Department of Defense (DoD) program to assist in the destruction of former Soviet nuclear and other weapons. The United States now funds threat reduction and nonproliferation programs through three agencies: DoD runs the Cooperative Threat Reduction program to attempt to secure and dismantle former Soviet nuclear and other weapons; the Department of Energy (DOE) runs several programs within its Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account, such as International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation and Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production, to secure nuclear weapons materials and knowledge; and the Department of State runs such programs as Science and Technology Centers in.CRS-9 Russia and Ukraine to provide weapons scientists with grant funding or employment on non-weapons projects.
II. Efforts To Secure HEU Worldwide. HEU is used in many research reactors around the world. The United States and the Soviet Union provided this material to many nations years ago. As noted above, much is very poorly guarded. It is a concern because acquiring a suitable quantity of HEU would be the most difficult step for terrorists intent on making a nuclear bomb. Efforts to secure some of this material have been ad hoc rather than part of a comprehensive plan. For example, in 1994 Project Sapphire reportedly removed from a “poorly guarded warehouse” in Kazakhstan enough HEU to make 20-50 nuclear weapons and brought it to the United States. In August 2002, Project Vinca reportedly removed enough HEU for two nuclear weapons from a research reactor in Serbia and flew it to Russia, where it had originated. On May 26, 2004, responding to such concerns, Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham announced a new Global Threat Reduction Initiative to secure Russian-origin fresh HEU by the end of 2005; to secure spent fuel of Russian/Soviet origin by 2010, and of U.S. origin within a decade; to convert the cores of civilian research reactors using HEU to be able to use uranium with a concentration of uranium-235 too low to be used in a nuclear weapon, and to try to identify and secure other nuclear and radiological materials that may pose a threat. For this effort, Secretary Abraham said, the United States plans to dedicate more than $450 million. Other DoE personnel indicated that sum is the approximate cost to complete the program, that the funds would probably be spent over more than 10 years, and that most of the funds would be for already-existing programs.
There are also concerns about the security of any Iranian and North Korean HEU, as discussed above, and Pakistani HEU.
Although in theory these are relatively successful programs, it is to be noted that corruption within the Russian Republic is rampant; the leadership of Russia is not pro-American and there is no reason to believe that enough former Soviet nuclear weaponry has not been or could be obtained by parties desiring it. All of these programs look very good in theory but are sadly lacking in practice.
III. Control of Former Soviet and Other Borders. While some programs discussed earlier seek to secure former Soviet nuclear weapons and fissile materials, DoE’s Second Line of Defense (SLD) and the State Department’s Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) Program provide assistance to Russia and other countries to prevent nuclear materials from being smuggled out through their borders. DOE states that SLD “deploys radiation detection monitors at strategic transit and border crossings and at air and sea transshipment hubs.”
IV. Container Security Initiative. CSI was started in January 2002 by the former U.S. Customs Service, now a part of CBP in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Shipping containers account for 90 percent of all world cargo; some 7 million are offloaded in U.S. seaports annually. Terrorists might attempt to ship a nuclear weapon to a U.S. port in a container and detonate it before the container was inspected. Accordingly, CSI screens containers in overseas ports before they are loaded onto U.S.-bound ships. CSI was operational in 18 ports as of March 2004, with another 20 in earlier stages of CSI implementation. Participating ports have U.S. CBP agents who work with host country officers to decide which containers to target for inspection; host country officers inspect suspicious containers using non-intrusive inspection devices such as gamma-ray imaging machines or using physical inspection. A portion of DOE’s SLD program, Mega-Ports, supports CSI by equipping some foreign seaports that are part of CSI with radiation detection equipment, and providing the necessary training, to “screen cargo for nuclear and radioactive materials that could be used in a weapon of mass destruction or a RDD (dirty bomb) ...”
V. Proliferation Security Initiative. PSI began in May 2003; by August 2004, 16 nations had joined. The participants seek to interdict sea or air shipments of WMD or WMD-related materials to or by states “of proliferation concern” trying to.CRS-11 acquire or transfer such items. Shipments could be interdicted at ports, in territorial waters, on the high seas, or in national airspace. According to press reports, the first interdiction under PSI was of the German ship BBC China in October 2003; the seizure of its Libya-bound cargo, thousands of parts for special centrifuges of value for enriching uranium, may have been influential in convincing Libya to abandon its WMD programs.
U.S. Border Security. The final line of defense tries to keep terrorists from smuggling a nuclear weapon across U.S. borders. It involves border patrols, barriers, remote sensors, radiation monitors, Customs inspections, seaport security, and the like, generally within the purview of CBP. Yet as noted in “Weapon Delivery,” above, there are great difficulties in securing the many “points” through which people and goods may enter legally, and the thousands of miles of “lines,” thinly-guarded stretches of coasts and land borders across which entry is illegal. These difficulties illustrate the importance of the other defensive layers noted earlier in this section and show why it would be unwise to rely solely on border security.
VI. Supporting Capabilities. Technology, intelligence, and forensics cut across and support the foregoing steps to keep terrorists or rogue states from acquiring and delivering a nuclear weapon.
VII. Technology Development. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107- 296, Sec. 302) makes the DHS Under Secretary for Science and Technology responsible for “coordinating the Federal Government’s civilian efforts to identify and develop countermeasures to” terrorist WMD threats. DHS is charged with coordinating efforts by many agencies, including DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration and the Department of Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology, to develop technology for homeland security. DHS has proposed various technology programs for FY2005. U.S. national laboratories (including the three nuclear weapons labs, Los Alamos, Livermore, and Sandia), U.S. and foreign corporations, universities, and others have been conducting R&D for new technologies to detect smuggling of nuclear materials and weapons. Detection of HEU and WGPU is difficult because, as noted, they are not highly radioactive. Various technologies are in use, such as radiation portal monitors, which passively detect radiation emitted by a source, and active imaging systems, like the Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS), which operate like x-ray machines. More advanced systems are being developed. For example, Livermore is developing a neutron-interrogation system to screen containers. It bombards a container with neutrons, producing nuclear fissions in such material as HEU and WGPU. The fissions produce gamma rays with specific energy levels unique to each substance, permitting identification. Detecting illegal movement across U.S. borders, in contrast, does not require detecting fissile material; relevant technologies include surveillance sensors and data analysis software.
VIII. Intelligence. The possibility that terrorists could evade any of the layers described above necessitates an enhanced intelligence capability to complement other means of detecting movement of nuclear materials and warheads. Such a capability could also focus the efforts of particular defenses, whether alerting a Russian facility that a smuggling plan was in the works or indicating that a particular cargo container might hold a nuclear weapon. Improving and organizing intelligence for homeland security have been sharply debated. Given the chronic state of disarray and gross bureaucratic incompetence displayed by U.S. intelligence organs, incompetence only suggested by recent 9ll commission meetings, again we have fine theory but very poor, if non existent, practice
This problem boils down to one of competence. Years of unquestioned power have made U.S. intelligence organs soft, overly bureaucratic and difficult to motivate. That the United States has not yet suffered an atomic attack is due more to good fortune than to patriotic fervor. When this happens, and it surely will, there will be much hand-wringing and mutual condemnation seen among the survivors. The chronic inability of American political and intelligence leaders to consider and address the root causes of terrorism directed against their country will, without any doubt, create an atmosphere in which such an attack, or attacks, will happen. What is needed, obviously, is a powerful centralized intelligence agency, removed from any political control, and fully independent. Given the nature of any long-established bureaucracy, to produce such an entity is analogous to standing in the garden on a crisp Autumn day to watch pigs fly south for the winter.